The practice of medicine has advanced from an art to a scientific art. There are those who wish to continue this progression and to reach the level of applied science. This is particularly the case with those responsible for funding health care, but is it possible or desirable?
The management of disease has been revolutionized by the enormous technological advances of recent decades, but these advances have not been achieved without great cost to the individuality of patients. Although the scientific understanding of disease is the basis of the revolution that has occurred, it is an altogether different matter to view science as the only valid discipline for the basis of patient care. There are influences other than the disease process which constitute the context in which the disease occurs; to ignore these may lead to excellent management of the disease but bad management of the patient. In other words, it is possible that technique, as laid down by a protocol, may neglect the individuality of a patient to the detriment of that patient.
There is a real possibility that by thinking only scientifically, medical practice will subconsciously slide into scientism a change that might prove difficult or impossible to reverse.
It is necessary to examine not only the changes, but also the reasons for changes, that have occurred in relationships between patient, disease, doctor and treatment.
Definitions
Science is an intellectual endeavour to explain the workings of the physical world. Technology refers to the practical arts that produce usable objects or ends. Scientism is the belief that scientific descriptions of reality are the only ones that matter1. Medical scientism could be defined as an approach to medical practice that regards the scientific understanding of the disease as the only relevant issue, whilst ignoring any other factors.
Medical scientism is found in two forms: (1) nothing outside the disease process is relevant; (2) there is nothing beyond scientific evaluation that is relevant. The distinction between science and scientism may appear subtle, but the effects are enormous. Good science accepts that there is truth, and therefore relevance, in other disciplines; scientism holds that only in science is true objectivity to be found. THE 
RISE OF SCIENTISM
Scientism is, in effect, one manifestation of philosophical modernism, which entails the belief that reason, coupled with scientific analysis and evaluation can bring us to complete understanding of all mysteries. This notion has several flaws. First, it requires that scientific theory be complete and understandable; second, that there should be no conflict between an individual and the population mean; third, that there can be no factors which are not amenable to scientific analysis (i.e. moral or spiritual); and finally that the philosophical principles underlying the claims should be enduring (true). There are reasons to doubt all four, and if these objections are valid then for medical practice to travel this path may prove erroneous.
How has scientism already affected medical practice? Historically, practice has been based on two relational triangles ( Figure 1 ). There has traditionally been an acceptance of the differing requirements of the patient (the many) and the disease (the one). The effect of scientism has been for the bond between patient and disease to become weakened and, increasingly, severed ( Figure 2 ). The end result is that the doctor concentrates ever more on triangle B.
There has always been conflict between the interests of the one and those of the many, but for medicine this has not been a great issue until the recent past. The tremendous technological advances in the management of disease have generated the impression that complete understanding and mastery of disease is within our grasp; and this has led to an assumption that what is right for the disease is inevitably right for the patient. If the medical profession does not come to terms with the question of the one and the many it will drift into scientism. Either triangle A is restored and given full weight or practice will revolve solely around triangle B. The end result is a medical version of modernism.
Secondly, such has been the concentration on the everchanging aspect of triangle B that some have judged that there is no conflict between triangles A and B. The assumption that correct management of the disease equals proper management of the patient has caused triangle A to go by default. Individuality is downgraded or ignored.
Thirdly, there has been a belief in the status of scientific theory and application of statistics that do not bear close examination.
Finally, modernist arguments have been held to be conclusive. However, modernism, is now discredited as a philosophical system to answer all problems, having collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions. This does not mean that all of modernism is wrong or its influence bad, but it does mean that the claims previously made can no longer be supported. The question, therefore, is not whether medical versions of modernism can endure unchallenged but when post-modernist thought will take hold and what its effect will be.
THE ONE AND THE MANY
Since the times of the ancient Greek philosophers Heraclitus and Parmenides there has been debate between the claims of individuality and uniformity; between those who let the whole override the particular, and those who come from the particular to the whole. In botany, for example, there are traditionally lumpers and splittersthose who lump ride rough-shod over small details, and those who are forever creating subspecies of subspecies. Down the ages individuality has often been made subservient to uniformity. Colin Gunton is surely correct when he writes:
Particularity is an offence to certain kinds of scientific mind as it is to certain kinds of political theorist. It tends to be untidy, but also to raise questions about the nature of things which some would prefer to leave unasked2.
This attitude, combined with the 'relentless pressure towards human homogeneity exerted by the success of Western technology', has left the interest of the individual precariously placed. There can be little doubt that a major feature of modern life is . . . its homogenising abolition of particularity. If you are real and important not as you particularly are, with your own distinctive strengths and weaknesses, bodily shape and genetic pattern, family history and structure, loves and sorrows, but as the bearer of some general characteristics, what makes you distinctly you becomes irrelevant2.
Many philosophers have therefore wrestled with the central question which now confronts the medical profession, can there be unity which reflects diversity?
If not then there are two possibilities. First, we may ignore the evidence of uniformity, arguing that, since each patient is unique, statistics cannot apply. The result is nonscientific quackery (Figure 1 A) . Secondly, we may ignore individuality and treat solely according to statistically determined parameters. This, therapeutic totalitarianism, is the essence of medical scientism (Figure 1 B) .
The other option is to practise a unity that does reflect diversity-'variable but always intimate'. This not only involves interpreting each in the light of the other (Figure 1 AB), but also accepting there will always be a grey area where the application of fixed rules is not appropriate. As Churchill remarked, 'nature never draws a line without smudging it'3. Good practice, therefore, involves not only knowledge of the rules and when they apply, but also, critically, knowledge of when they do not apply.
Disengagement of patient from disease If the individuality of the patient is denied, then management becomes solely dependent on the state of the disease. Some have argued that, because a certain treatment has statistically the best outcome, then that is the correct management for all patients with this condition. This ignores the context in which the condition arises. If we accept that factors exterior to the disease process may have a bearing-e.g. age, general health, psychological make-up-then a single condition can be correctly managed by a complete range of treatment options, from the most radical to nothing at all. The factors determining correct management may be totally independent of the disease itself. As an example, correct management of a large carcinoma of larynx may be laryngectomy, but when the patient is demented and very old the operation is contraindicated.
The advantage of disengaging the patient from the disease is that difficult variables are removed. It is a prerequisite for the drafting of tight protocols but can lead to bad practice.
Treatment centred on results of investigations If conditions can be managed without reference to the context in which they occur, as must happen with treatment dictated by protocol, there is a temptation to fix criteria that have to be met before certain treatments are provided. That this argument is fallacious can be shown by looking at the place of investigations.
The conventional method of determining how a patient should be treated is based on three disciplines history, examination and special investigation. The aim of this is to establish the diagnosis, gauge the severity (functions of uniformity), determine the degree of morbidity (a function of individuality) and ascertain the best way to manage the disease in its context. Many investigations are solely aids to diagnosis, giving no indication of severity. An example from my own specialty is tympanometry in glue ear, qualitative but not quantitative. Even investigations that provide quantitative information may be far short of assessing disability or morbidity. Consider pure tone audiometry, again in glue ear. The ability to hear pure tones does not of necessity correlate with ability to decipher speech. Therefore pure tone audiometry should not be a front-line determinant of whom to treat. To determine auditory disability would require advanced free-field speech audiometry in simulated background noise something that does physical phenomena, it was claimed, would soon be explained. So much so that young scientists were steered
The troubles a disease process causes to a patient can also be external to the disease itself. For example, the steeplejack with vertigo has a different degree of morbidity from the office worker.
OBJECTIONS TO SCIENTISM Application of scientific data
Many scientific theories (particularly those applied to medicine) are based on statistical analysis of data from controlled experiments. This means that a scientist can accurately predict what will happen to a percentage of reactions or, in the case of medicine, patients; but, like the life insurance salesman, who can give a very accurate life expectancy for a group of similar individuals, the scientist is unable to predict how a disease will behave in the individual patient.
We are all aware of the escape clause in any prediction-'other things being equal'. In the world of clinical medicine other things rarely are equal.
The purpose of statistical analysis is to determine commonality within the context of variability. The variables, however, are what constitute the individuality of the patient. They cannot be ignored just because they do not fit the model (protocol). A great paradox surrounds the issue of the use of statistical data in clinical medicine. Elaborate techniques are employed to remove variables, only for the results to be used to justify uniformity of treatment. The techniques are required precisely because there is infinite variety. If every patient behaved in exactly the same way, then statistical analysis would be unnecessary; a series of one would determine how all would behave.
Status of scientific theory This matter was elegantly dealt with in 1936 when Lord
Cherwell was asked to give his thoughts on the conflict between science and religion. He stated that what scientists do is to create a model to explain the experimental results that have accumulated. The fatal error often made then, and still today, is to believe that the model is the reality4.
What happens is that, the model having been made, experiments are designed to test the validity of the model, either in part or in whole. Eventually, experiments will be designed whose results are incompatible with the model. When enough results have been obtained which contradict the model, then a new model will be created. However clever, it is still only a model. A further complication is that old and new models are often not even compatible.
An illustration comes from the world of physics, which was at the heart of nineteenth century scientific advance and of modernist claims. Newton reigned supreme and all not feature in any protocol. away from physics since there seemed little more to be discovered. However, instruments built on the principles of Newtonian physics became so precise that, in the 1890s, results were obtained that were inconsistent with the theory. The new physics (quantum and Einsteinian) had to be developed to explain the results.
In medical practice most disease processes are understood within the framework of Newtonian physics, which is within the comprehension of most doctors. Quantum theory, even the principles, is a closed book. Now we hear arguments that current quantum theory is inadequate to explain the workings of the minds. If we accept that psychological factors affect both the natural history of disease and the response to treatment then we will never understand all factors influencing outcome until we understand the workings of the mind. How many people will be able to comprehend it?
The increasing complexity of the models required to explain experimental findings raises the question as to whether complete understanding is achievable.
First, such has been the change over the past 100 years that, even if the final answer had already emerged, centuries might have to pass before we could be certain that the final model was reality. Even after the most exhaustive experimentation, there could be no guarantee that the future would not produce inconsistencies. The argument that 'it works' is inadmissible. There were, and still are, tremendous benefits from Newtonian physics. In the late nineteenth century few would have believed that this was not the final answer.
Second, it would be necessary to prove that there is no reality beyond the material world; or that, if such a thing existed, it could have no effect in the physical world.
To proceed as if total understanding is within our grasp might therefore be unwise.
MODERNISM AND POST-MODERNISM
Modernism is the philosophy which grew out of the Age of Enlightenment. The principal tenet is that human reason allied to scientific experimentation and analysis would provide complete understanding of all aspects of the physical world. In other words, there was unified truth which was comprehensible-truth being defined as the agreement of our ideas with things as they are6. There was a belief in the absolute objectivity and superiority of science, which overruled all other disciplines7. The curious feature is that modernism took so long to capture the soul of medicine. This is probably a result of the time-lag required for the philosophical principles to work through into scientific theory and then into technology. Only in the last 50 years has the pace of technology speeded up.
While we may congratulate ourselves on the progress, we should not be blind as to what has happened elsewhere. Cracks began to appear in modernism before the end of the last century. As the dominant political philosophy, the age of modernism is over. According to Thomas Oden, it lasted exactly 200 years, from 1789 (the fall of the Bastille) to 1989 (the fall of the Berlin wall)8. Charles Jenks dates the end of modernism at 15 July 1972 when a housing development in St Louis was demolished. Though designed as a monument to all that was best in modernist architecture and technology, it was so impersonal as to be uninhabitable9. The point of these two examples is that human beings cannot indefinitely survive in systems that deny individuality.
The fear for modern medicine, if it continues to be seduced by the charms of modernism, is that it will suffer the same fate as the communist block and the St Louis housing development. The very people we aim to serve will turn away, not because we cannot cure their diseases better than ever before, but because medicine will have become inhuman. The sick will turn to those who treat them as human, and perhaps we are beginning to see just this in the rise of some forms of alternative medicine.
If the central pillar of modernism was the belief in the ability of reason to provide complete answers to all ills, so post-modernism holds that there are no absolutes, no objectivity-only relativism. In other words, the foundation of modern medicine, that it is based in scientific fact, is disbelieved, because there are no facts.
How will post-modernism be worked out in clinical practice? It is too early to say, but I predict a turning away from acceptance that statistically determined treatments have any relevance to the individual. It is possible that we will be confronted with the situation of the patient saying:
Your truth tells you that an inflamed appendix is best removed. My truth tells me that you cannot know what is true for me and I will not accept your advice.
Second, a view of individuality may appear that is totally disengaged from the disease. Great emphasis will be placed on satisfying the needs of the individual, even when this conflicts with the management of the disease. There will be a denial of any interplay between the patient and the disease. Far from restoring the broken patient/disease bond there will be a complete dissociation. There will be complete decontextualization of patient, disease, doctor and technology.
THE REMEDY
Philosophical modernism working out as medical scientism has weakened or severed the critical bond between patient and disease. The rise of postmodernism will take this a stage further. Can the classic synthesis of Figure 1 be restored?
The conflict between the claims of individuality and uniformity may never be reconciled, but the 'art' of medicine has always been the dynamic interaction10 between these contradictory positions. This requires that we 'close the loop' of triangle A. If there is truth in both positions then we must hold the two in tension. The only way in which this can be achieved is for each to be interpreted in the light of the other. It is necessary to develop not only an understanding of the common behaviour of disease within the context of infinite variety, but also an understanding of individuality within the context of similarity.
